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Decentering Human Rights from the
International Order of States: The Alignment




This article accounts for recent developments in corporate social
responsibility, international trade and investment law, international
human rights law, development aid, and the laws of home states
reaching extraterritorially in order to advance a regulatory perspective
on commerce and human rights. While these developments are
remarkable, the analysis documents the prevalence of softer strategies
and a corresponding scarcity of coercive legalization strategies. The
question, then, is how to reason about these recent developments and
their genuine potential for human rights protection. The article proposes
two elements-a root-cause orientation and the interaction of policy
channels-as indispensable for a regulatory and systemic perspective on
business and human rights. To make corporate activities compliant with
human rights, the emerging regulatory regime cannot afford to waste
any source of leverage. In a less state-centric global order, this is a search
for a multichannel, rights-holder-centered, transnational regulatory
perspective that highlights alignment, interaction, and complementarity
among international policy channels where strength can be achieved by
creating a "rope"from weaker strands.
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, as it unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights,' the U.N. Human Rights Council
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recognized their contribution "to a socially sustainable globalization,
without foreclosing any other long-term development, including further
enhancement of standards."2 That was the culmination of a six-year
U.N. mandate carried out by Professor John Ruggie to bring conceptual
clarity and coherence to the policy area of business and human rights.
3
Ruggie maintained that progress in this area should be built on three
"pillars": the obligations of states to protect human rights, the
responsibilities of companies to respect human rights wherever they
operate, and the access to remedies for victims of business-related
infringements of human rights. The U.N. Guiding Principles are now
accepted as international "soft law" and have already proved their
utility by becoming the normative reference point for numerous public
actors (e.g., the United Nations and states) and private ones (e.g.,
companies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)).
In regulatory terms, Ruggie broke4 with the international law
ambitions of the U.N. Draft Norms5 -a previous effort within the
United Nations to set standards of responsible business conduct-and
instead put forward a less state-centered and less law-dependent view of
the emerging business and human rights regime that he called
"polycentric governance."6 The theory of change detectable behind
1. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/17/31, at 6-23 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
Guiding Principles].
2. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., May 30, 2015-June 17, 2011, U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 53, A/17/4, 4 (June 16, 2011).
3. See generally JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) (discussing Ruggie's own account of the U.N.
mandate).
4. See id. at 47-68 ("In my first report to the Human Rights Commission, I concluded
... that the Norms suffered from 'exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities,'
and that they were 'engulfed by [their] own doctrinal excesses.").
5. See generally United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Hum. Rts., Sub-
Comm. on the Promotion & Protection of Hum. Rts., Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4ISub.2/2003/l2Rev.2 (Aug.
13, 2003) ("Reaffirming that transnational corporations and other business enterprises,
their officers . . . have, inter alia, human rights obligations and responsibilities and that
these human rights norms will contribute to the making and development of international
law as to those responsibilities and obligations.").
6. RUGGIE, supra note 3, at xhii-xliv ('The most fundamental [aspect when
developing the Guiding Principles] was to recognize and build on a core feature of the
governance of multinational corporations . . . . Three distinct governance systems affect
their conduct in relation to human rights: the system of public law ... a civil governance
system ... and corporate governance .... [E]ach of these governance systems needs to be
mobilized and pull [sic] in compatible directions.").
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Ruggie's U.N. mandate was to move to a critical mass by leveraging as
many sources of authority as possible and getting them to interact in a
process of cumulative progress.7 Notably, Ruggie clearly took issue with
single-minded proponents of either corporate voluntarism or legalistic
solutions.8 Legalization is needed, Ruggie acknowledged; however, he
did not believe that starting with an international treaty would
necessarily be the best way forward, especially an overarching treaty.
Instead, he called for a narrow treaty-making effort and for changes to
domestic law as first steps in a longer process of legalization.9 The
legacy of Ruggie begins with a fundamental break in conceptualizing
corporate responsibilities. He conceived of them as neither isolated from
nor dependent on state obligations, embedded in a global policy context
where hierarchy and formal legal authority cannot be assumed for
convenience, but where public authority and the normativity of human
rights seek new ways to reassert themselves, and in a human rights
context where the premium is not on lofty reaffirmation of values but on
leveraging all available sources of change to make a difference for rights
holders.
If one would be tempted to boil down to one word Ruggie's mandate,
that word would be "leverage." His quest, then, for cumulative progress
would be explained as an effort to maximize that leverage through the
activation and combination of all sources of leverage.10 This article
7. Id. at 78 ("[A] new regulatory dynamic was required under which public and
private governance systems . . . each come to add distinct value, compensate for one
another's weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles-out of which a more
comprehensive and effective global regime might evolve, including specific legal
measures."); see also Guiding Principles, supra note 1, 13 (discussing "cumulative
progress").
8. See RUGGIE, supra note 3, at 78, 171.
9. See Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises:
Recommendations on Follow-Up to the Mandate, Bus. AND HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR. (Feb.
11, 2011), http:/fbusiness-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie/
ruggie-special-mandate-follow-up-11-feb-2011.pdf (recommending a follow-up mandate to
embed the Guiding Principles at national and local levels and to clarify then-current
international legal standards); see also John Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of
Truth for UN Business and Human Rights Treaty, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & Bus. (July 8,
2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/past-as-prologue.html.
10. RUGGIE, supra note 3, at 124 ("[The Guiding Principles] provide a foundation for
expanding the international human rights regime to encompass not only countries and
individuals, but also companies. In doing so, they embrace the moral value and intrinsic
power of the idea of humans rights, but also recognize that in the context of the global
economy human rights can be realized in relation to business only by leveraging the
multiple governance systems that shape the conduct of multinational corporations: public,
civil, and corporate. Maximizing their combined leverage, however, requires a common
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reflects on this legacy from a regulatory and corporate accountability
perspective, which is able to address root causes of human rights
infringements and add new arrangements to enhance the protection of
human rights.1' The aim is to grasp the emergence of a transnational
regulatory regime that, by mobilizing new sources of public and private
authority, creates a new regulatory dynamic that augments the
traditional state-centered and territory-based protection of human
rights with the leverage brought by international economic
interdependencies and multinational enterprises (MNEs). This would
move the discussion beyond the rather descriptive account of policy
domains that the Guiding Principles offer in the first pillar and also
reverse the tendency to silo such policy domains in academic
literature. 12
The questions informing this inquiry into the potential and
necessity of aligning several policy domains are considered in Part I.
What was the contribution of the U.N. mandate to this new regulatory
dynamic? Why is it essential for a regulatory perspective to separate
two main types of corporate involvement in human rights abuses? What
are some noteworthy recent developments in other policy domains that
bear on corporate responsibilities? Why and how can these policy
domains be analyzed together with corporate responsibilities in a
coherent way? Part II delves into the Guiding Principles to highlight
some key notions and distinctions relevant to this inquiry as well as
their significance for regulatory perspectives on business and human
rights. Part III accounts for recent developments in several policy
"channels"13 in a way that highlights the mobilization, alignment, and
platform from which reinforcing effects and cumulative change can be generated."
(emphasis added)).
11. The notion of "root causes" is employed in this article to point to underlying causes
that might unintentionally or deliberately be overlooked when corporations and other
actors respond to human rights abuses. See Radu Mares, Raoul Wallenberg Inst., Second
Panel Speaker at the ESIL Third Conference, The United Nations Guiding Principles and
the Root Causes of Human Rights Infringements: Is the Concept of Due Diligence up to
the Task? (Sept. 3, 2014) (on file with author).
12. The literatures covering CSR, trade and labor, foreign direct investment and host
country development, aid, and trade and human rights have evolved largely separately.
See generally DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2009) (supplying a remarkable, though not fully integrated, treatment of policy
streams).
13. This article refers to several policy domains or policy pathways as "channels" to
impress the idea of alignment, interaction, and convergence on a root cause, such as
weaknesses in the host state's regulatory regime. The channels examined are inter-state
channels ("state-state" relations through the IHRL treaty machinery, international trade,
and development assistance) and the intra-firm channel of MNEs (a company's relations
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interaction of old and new sources of leverage. Part IV situates these
developments against a theoretical backdrop of the emerging
transnational business and human rights regime. Besides highlighting
the renewed search for policy coherence and alignment of policy
channels to tackle root causes, this analysis depicts the legal
institutionalization of corporate responsibilities as an attempt by public
law to reassert its influence through the intrafirm channel of MNEs in a
wider context of polycentric governance and multiple rationalities
shaping business operations.
I. THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE U.N.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Principle 11 of the Guiding Principles establishes the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights, meaning that business
enterprises "should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and
should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved."14 Principle 13, however, is most consequential for this
analysis. It defines corporate responsibility broadly, and, by
differentiating levels of involvement in harm, it directs attention to
separate root causes of human rights infringements in the value chain.
15
Two contexts of corporate responsibility need to be separated, as they
raise decidedly different problems of legal institutionalization. This is
taken up in Part I.A. Keeping the two contexts analytically separate
prevents the regulatory discussion from seamlessly slipping from one
context to the other, which would only seed confusion and nurture
unwarranted expectations regarding available regulatory strategies.
This is further explored in Part I.B. The major payoff, however, is to
open a window of reflection on how exactly the policy channels described
in Part III relate to each of the two contexts, and why these channels
must and can overcome their weaknesses through alignment and
interaction to deal with root causes of infringements.
A. Contribution of U.N. Guiding Principles: Scope and Contexts of
Corporate Responsibility
Following the Guiding Principles, it is now well-accepted that a
company's conduct can result in infringements of virtually all human
with its affiliates that are either managed "voluntarily" (under the label CSR) or regulated
by home state laws).
14. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 13.
15. Id. at 14.
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rights, whether by operations under its direct control or those of its
affiliates. In Principle 13, the Guiding Principles spell out the three
scenarios-causation, contribution, linkage-to which the responsibility
to respect human rights applies:
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that
business enterprises:
(a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human
rights impacts through their own activities, and address
such impacts when they occur;
(b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights
impacts that are directly linked to their operations,
products or services by their business relationships,
even if they have not contributed to those impacts.16
Principle 13, read in conjunction with Principle 19, defines the scope
of corporate responsibility broadly and is a significant legacy of the U.N.
mandate.17 Harms occurring in the operations of subsidiaries,
subcontractors, and other business partners are clearly covered through
the responsibility to respect human rights. The company has a
responsibility to identify and address such impacts on human rights not
only in its own operations, as in the workplace or local community, but
also in affiliates' operations abroad. Breaking conceptually with the
past, Ruggie argued that what determines the existence of the
responsibility to respect is "impact" (meaning a human right is infringed
somewhere in the value chain), not "leverage" (meaning the ability of a
company to influence the entity in the value chain). In this way, Ruggie
explicitly rejected the traditional corporate approach towards supply-
chain management; the latter would often stop at the first tier of
suppliers over which the buyer had contractual leverage, while ignoring
severe abuses happening at lower tiers of the value chain. As a
consequence of this conceptualization, the company has a responsibility
for harms occurring in third-party operations even if it did not
contribute in any way to the human rights violation (linkages scenario),
or if its conduct reflects only a partial and/or remote causality to the
16. Id.
17. See INT'L TRADE UNION CONFERENCE, THE UNITED NATIONS "PROTECT, RESPECT,
REMEDY" FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE FOR TRADE UNIONISTS,
17-18 (2012), available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/12-04-23_ruggie-background_
fd.pdf.
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harm (contribution scenario). From this broad scope of the responsibility
to act, two major aspects are visible through root cause lenses and in
terms of responsibility (to act) to exercise leverage.
In a transnational context, Principle 13 puts forward two types of
root causes: one lying squarely with the core company (Type 1 cause),1s
and another root cause having to do with the affiliate and its regulatory
environment; that is, the host country's legal regime under which the
affiliate in the value chain operates (Type 2 cause). Staying in the
multinational-enterprise context, the "triad" causation-contribution-
linkages contained in Principle 13 reveals distinct root-cause contexts:
"causation" refers to Type 1 cause, "contribution" to both Type 1 and 2
causes, and "linkages" to Type 2 cause. The implications are profound.
First, the core company cannot obscure a root cause under its control
merely because the harm occurred remotely in an affiliate's operations
and causality is indirect, given third-party involvement.19 Such a
culpable core company cannot hide behind the remoteness of impacts,
and maybe the failings of its affiliate, but has to acknowledge Type 1
causes and the harm generated by its own decisions. Second, the core
company cannot separate itself too easily from another root cause (Type
2 cause regarding the affiliate's conduct and the host country regulatory
regime) just because the company did not cause the harm through its
own culpable decisions. The company is still linked to adverse impacts
through its business relationships and has to first exercise leverage to
address the negative impacts before cutting links with the supplier.20 In
other words, the company cannot disclaim Type 2 causes and pursue
18. The term 'core company' refers herein to influential companies operating through
subsidiaries and global supply chains. See Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate
Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL. L. REV. 879, 886-91 (2012)
(detailing the characteristics of corporate groups, parent companies, and subsidiary
entities).
19. Examples of this kind may involve the decisions of buyers to change styles often or
on short notice, or more broadly to devise sourcing arrangements that rely on flexibility,
fast turnaround and low costs, which create downward pressures on suppliers; a
foreseeable consequence is suppliers not complying with labor standards. See RICHARD M.
LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 126-29 (2013) (detailing relationship between upstream business
practices and factory-level labor conditions); see also infra pp. 26-27.
20. Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 19 ("If the business enterprise has leverage to
prevent or mitigate the adverse impact, it should exercise it. And if it lacks leverage there
may be ways for the enterprise to increase it. Leverage may be increased by, for example,
offering capacity-building or other incentives to the related entity, or collaborating with
other actors. There are situations in which the enterprise lacks the leverage to prevent or
mitigate adverse impacts and is unable to increase its leverage. Here, the enterprise
should consider ending the relationship, taking into account credible assessments of
potential adverse human rights impacts of doing so.").
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business as usual by resorting to legal technicalities, such as not owning
or contracting with the supplier whose operations infringe human
rights, or pointing to practical difficulties of having limited leverage, if
any. The impact still has to be addressed, and there are multiple
modalities to exercise leverage over Type 2 causes.
In terms of a responsibility to act, the Guiding Principles do not
impose impossible or unreasonable requirements on the core company
for impacts occurring throughout the value chain.21 The major difference
for current purposes is that depending on the root cause, the
responsibility to respect becomes a responsibility to cease harmful
conduct in the context of Type 1 causes (the "causation" and
"contribution" scenarios) and a responsibility to exercise leverage over
the third party in the context of Type 2 causes (the "linkages" and
"contribution" scenarios) before termination of relationship is
contemplated. Clearly the responsibility to exercise leverage is more
complicated from a regulatory angle, both in its justification (why
should the company act?) as well as, and especially, in terms of
specifying and enforcing the company's duty to act (how to exercise
leverage?). Therefore, Part I.B distinguishes the "cessation" regime from
the "leverage" regime, corresponding to Type 1 and Type 2 root causes,
respectively.
It is, however, not enough to note that the responsibility to
respect-in Principle 13-has a broad scope encompassing the two root
causes; it is important that the operational concept of human rights due
diligence-Principles 17-21-does not fracture the message and also
displays a decisive root-cause orientation in identifying and addressing
impacts. A root-cause orientation is essential for due diligence to go
beyond treating symptoms and superficial causes and instead uncover
deeper causes wherever they might be in the value chain and thus
enable appropriate action by the company, alone or in conjunction with
other policy channels.22 One can detect in the Guiding Principles and
explanatory materials a proper root-cause orientation. The Interpretive
21. For example, the responsibility of core companies merely 'linked," under Principle
13(b), to abusive third parties does not include remedying the harm; the responsibility to
remediate remains with the affiliate and the host state per Principle 22. See Guiding
Principles, supra note 1, at 14, 20-21.
22. When it comes to root causes of infringements of human rights in the affiliate's
operations, a diversity of root causes are identifiable including: those in and outside of the
value chain; those in corporate decisions taken in host or home states; and those in the
domain of the law (repressive or inadequate regulations), market (profit-maximization and
cost-cutting tendencies throughout the value chain), or societal conditions (poverty,
cultural attitudes and management style, and so on). One cause of non-compliance with
human rights standards is always the disincentive coming from host government's law
and practice (either repressive laws or non-enforcement of adequate laws).
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Guide issued by the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), to which Ruggie contributed, explicitly mentions "root
cause analysis" as one method useful in tracking effectiveness, which is
the due-diligence step outlined in Principle 20.23 Later works from
organizations with which Ruggie is associated explicitly interpret the
due-diligence concept in terms of root causes.
24
B. Legal Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility
With a root-cause orientation established, it is important to discern
the harder and softer regulatory and nonregulatory options available to
policymakers to tackle each of the two types of root cause. The two
regimes corresponding to each type are kept analytically separate in
order to assess the opportunity of harder or softer strategies to alter
business conduct and the role of the policy channels in tackling root
causes under each regime.
As to strategies of legal institutionalization, there are major
differences between the two regimes. Under the "cessation regime"
(cause-contribute), dealing with Type 1 cause (i.e., the core company's
own misconduct), "hard" legal institutionalization of the corporate
responsibility to respect in the form of coercion and instituting a
prohibition of harmful conduct is not conceptually difficult. Indeed, the
"cessation regime" can be approached through classical principles of
civil and criminal liability. By contrast, "softer" legal
institutionalization always appears inadequate to the task of ensuring
the company is ceasing its harmful conduct. In fact, there are both legal
precedents and legal principles to rely on to cover such torts and crimes,
even though they occur, in our discussion, in a transnational setting.25
Indeed, notwithstanding that infringements of human rights occur in
the operations of the affiliate, the type of root cause addressed by this
regime is the same-Type 1. Because the core company appears as an
accomplice or joint tortfeasor, difficulties for legal institutionalization of
the responsibility to respect arise only in establishing legal elements of
liability such as causality, proximity, foreseeability, fault, and so on.
Here it is essential to strive to keep the two regimes analytically
separate and not slip seamlessly from "cessation" to "leverage," a
23. See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., The Corporate Responsibility to
Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide 54, HR/PUB/12/02 (2012) ("A root cause
analysis can help pinpoint what actions by which parts of the enterprise, or by which
other parties related to the enterprise, played a role in generating the impact, and how.").
24. Mares, supra note 11.
25. Legal suits from UK and Canada are at hand. See, e.g,, Choc v. Hudbay Minerals,
Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414 (Can.); Chandler v. Cape [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (U.K.).
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slippage often encountered in insufficiently specified arguments over an
"MNE's social responsibility" that misrepresent the corporate
involvement in abuse and stretch legal argumentation to a breaking
point. Where a limit is reached, rather than risking inconsistency with
principles of tort and criminal liability, the discussion could be carried
further in terms of linkage to harm and accompanying responsibility to
exercise leverage. That, however, raises different challenges for hard
and soft legal institutionalization.
The "leverage regime" (contribute-linkages) tackles Type 2 root
causes; that is, the affiliate's misconduct and the inadequacies of the
host country's regulatory regime. In contrast to the "cessation regime,"
under the "leverage regime" the company respects human rights
infringed by its affiliate's operations by exercising its leverage, not
merely by ceasing its own conduct. Indeed, the matter is not one of
cessation. Rather, according to Principle 19, only when leverage fails is
the company asked to cease, to sever the relationship with the abusive
affiliate. Under the "leverage regime," the task of legal
institutionalization is not one of prohibition, but of mobilizing and
guiding leverage. Could hard, coercive legal strategies hitting at the top
of the value chain (core company)-as in the "cessation regime"-
achieve this leverage objective? As a matter of precedent, hard legal
institutionalization options are scarce in this context. Recent
transnational regulatory regimes prohibiting the trade in "tainted
goods," such as illegal timber or conflict minerals, might appear to
furnish analogues, but the analogy does not hold. Hard regulatory
strategies lead to incentives for premature disengagement by core
companies, thus harming rights holders rather than protecting them.
26
This makes such coercive strategies problematic in the human rights
context. Here, the importance of mobilizing and preserving the leverage
produced in the intrafirm channel is paramount, as witnessed by NGO
advocacy that rarely calls for disengagement from problematic affiliates.
The enemy is hasty disengagement as opposed to "last resort"
disengagement. The Guiding Principles reflect this concern by
sequencing the appropriate action expected under the "linkages"
scenario as leverage first, terminate relationship second.27 Therefore,
any hard institutionalization options targeting solely the core companies
have to be assessed against the real danger of actually destroying the
leverage added by the intrafirm channel rather than securing that
26. See Child Labor Deterrence Act (Harkin Bill) of 1993, S. 613, 103d Cong.
(exemplifying the unintended effects on right-holders (child laborers) of a hard law
strategy that, if enacted, would have banned the importing of goods produced with child
work).
27. See Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 18-19 (Principle 19 Commentary).
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leverage. Softer legal institutionalization strategies-such as
transparency regulations-suddenly become more attractive. The
question, then, is how to ensure that softer strategies actually make a
difference, which is where the multichannel perspective comes into play
as the key to legally institutionalizing the 'leverage" regime.
As to the role of public policy channels, they can clearly support the
"cessation regime" and thus legalize the corporate responsibility to
respect. State channels-international human rights law, trade,
investment, home state laws-employ legal instruments that could
"host" the responsibility of core companies and thus address Type 1 root
causes. References to the social responsibilities of MNEs in such
instruments would create hard or soft legal incentives for core
companies to act responsibly. When it comes to the "leverage" regime,
the state channels- international human rights law, trade, investment,
aid-are relevant not simply as potential "hosts" for the social
responsibilities of companies, but equally as channels impacting directly
on the host state. A host state, as party to such international
agreements and cooperation schemes, could be expected to meet some
human rights standards within their territories by regulating domestic
companies which appear as affiliates in multinational groups and
networks. Thus these state channels target directly the host state's
regulatory regime, and so Type 2 root causes. The opportunity then
arises for the often limited leverage that core companies have over their
suppliers to align naturally with, and potentially interact with, the
leverage summoned by other policy channels targeting the root causes of
inadequate host state regulations and affiliate misconduct. Part II gives
examples of the aforementioned possibilities in several policy channels
for mobilizing and aligning leverages in order to tackle root causes.
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FIVE POLICY CHANNELS
This section highlights promising developments in five policy
channels: international trade law, international human rights law,
development aid, home state laws with extraterritorial effects, and
"corporate social responsibility" (CSR). There are some seeds for
optimism, precedents, and experiments coming to maturity in these
areas. What is notable is that human rights appear as a legitimate
concern in old and new policy channels: traditional channels promoting
human rights (such as human rights and development aid) have been
joined by economic channels that previously shunned human rights
concerns (such as trade and the intrafirm channels of MNEs). What is
more, as witnessed by myriads of cross-references and joint programs
presented in this section, these channels increasingly interact and align,
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creating opportunities to harvest and direct their combined leverage
towards the root causes of human rights infringements. The openness,
interdependency, and ubiquity of economic exchange make it slightly
harder for public and private decision makers to avoid scrutiny and
responsibility for their decisions' impacts on human rights. The
challenge is to capitalize on this opening and devise a regulatory
perspective on business and human rights encompassing "state-state
channels" and "intrafirm channels," and knitting harder and softer
institutionalization strategies into a protective network for rights
holders. In examining these new regulatory dynamics, I focus on how
these channels address root causes and on the actual or potential
alignment and interaction of these channels.
A. State-State Channels: International Trade Law
This section analyses the relation between labor rights and
international trade law by discussing the progression from the Word
Trade Organization (WTO) stalemate of the mid-1990s; to the multitude
of (mainly bilateral) free trade agreements including labor clauses; to
the emergence of more complex trade agreements that include, inter
alia, investment provisions (an amalgamation of trade and investment
aspects); and finally to the ongoing negotiations of megaregional
agreements between industrialized countries (e.g., the U.S.-EU
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership currently being
negotiated).
When the WTO was established in 1994, it was the culmination of
decades of effort to liberalize international trade. At the time, the WTO
arrangement was questioned for not dealing with social aspects linked
to the production of goods and services traded internationally.28 The
controversy centered on whether a "social clause" should be included
within the WTO agreements to protect labor and human rights.29 The
matter was settled in the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, which
passed the task of protecting labor rights to the International Labour
Organization (ILO).3° As a result, the linkage between trade and labor
rights was cut at the multilateral level.31 The multilateral WTO trade
law, however, allows states the possibility to agree to further
28. See KINLEY, supra note 12, at 47-50.
29. See id.
30. See World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December
1996, WTO Doc. WTIMIN(96)/DEC, at 4, available at https:/lvww.wto.org/english/
thewto e/minist-e/min96e/wtodece.htm.
31. Regarding the limited opportunities for raising human rights issues under article
XX of WTO, see KINLEY, supra note 12, at 66-67, 70-77.
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liberalization measures on a bilateral or regional basis (resulting in
Free Trade Agreements), as well as giving preferential trade terms to
less developed states willing to pursue their development objectives
through facilitated access to the markets of developed countries
(resulting in General System of Preferences). The link between trade
and labor and human rights flourished at these two levels of Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) and General System of Preferences (GSPs).
The proliferation of FTAs-bilateral or regional-is a notable
development not only for their growing number, but also for the
inclusion of labor clauses in fifty-eight out of 250 trade agreements,32
something that appeared unthinkable years ago during the WTO
controversy. The social clauses vary in content, with approaches ranging
from asking the state to not lower or fail to implement existing domestic
labor law protections, to adopting laws that uphold the -ILO's
fundamental labor rights.3 In terms of implementation, the majority of
FTAs (60 percent) contain promotional strategies only, and where more
coercive options exist they have been rarely activated.34 That indicates
that the bulk of implementation efforts are bound to be of a cooperative
rather than coercive nature, or a softer rather than hard
institutionalization strategy. It is an indication that the state-state
trade channel has managed to overcome the suspicions of protectionism
arising from attempts to include a social clause backed by hard, coercive
sanctions at the multilateral level of the WTO by proceeding instead at
bilateral and regional levels with a social clause backed largely by
softer, cooperative measures.35 It is a testament to the state-state trade
channel surprisingly managing to deliver leverage towards Type 2 root
causes; in the same time it is a limited leverage that highlights the
necessity to seek alignment with other policy channels. The state-state
channel thus provides some leverage to address Type 2 root causes, but
it is limited, and must be supplemented by other means.
What do these FTAs reveal in terms of the potential for interaction
with other channels? Clearly, the cooperation provisions point towards
an easy alignment with the development-aid and human-rights-law
channels, as both aim to strengthen the capacity of host-state
32. As of 2013, there were 58 trade agreements (out of 248) including social clauses
(those concluded by the United States, European Union, and Canada). INT'L INST. FOR
LABOUR STUD., SocIAL DIMENSIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 5, 19 (rev. ed. 2015)
[hereinafter IILS].
33. See generally Fraser Simpson, Labour Rights Protections within International
Trade: A Study of Free Trade Agreements and Generalised Systems of Preferences (2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2686050.
34. See IILS, supra note 32, at 69. This point has been illustrated in four cases
involving the United States. Id. at 3.
35. See generally KINLEY, supra note 12, at 66-68.
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institutions to devise and implement adequate labor laws. What of
interaction with the intrafirm channel? The connection is not a natural
one, as pure trade agreements address the macro-level of trade at which
states reduce tariffs on goods crossing their borders. The intrafirm
channel, by contrast, addresses the micro-level of trade through
corporate value chains where responsible business practices would cover
top-down efforts by core companies and industries (CSR) as well as
bottom-up efforts by suppliers to gain private certification (i.e., fair
trade regimes). One frequently cited example is the U.S.-Cambodia
Textile Agreement. In this agreement (terminated in 2004 due to the
expiration of the Multi Fibre Arrangement), the United States promised
to increase quotas for Cambodian exports should the Cambodian
government commit to labor standards in its garment industry. The
result was the Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) scheme,36 a special
compliance program for the garment industry that did not pursue
compliance with labor standards in a classic manner through public
regulation and labor inspections, but generated an alternative
arrangement in the form of a private scheme. The BFC attracted the
involvement of the ILO and the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) (the human-rights-law and development-aid channels) as well as
that of international buyers (the CSR channel) that relied on the
credible audits performed by BFC. The BFC can be seen as an example
of alignment and convergence of different channels to address a Type 2
root cause and deliver a locally protective arrangement for Cambodian
workers. Triggered by the trade agreement (the trade channel, through
a hard legal strategy of conditioning market access), several other
channels (the aid, human-rights-law, and intrafirm channels through
CSR) aligned and converged on a formalized private protective scheme.
The European Union has put forward its "values-based trade
agenda," containing modern FTAs and GSPs. Notably, the 2012 EU
Communication on Trade, Growth and Development expressly refers to
"private sustainability-bound schemes (e.g. fair, ethical or organic)" and
CSR.37 It is a reference to the intrafirm channel that points the reader
towards the interaction of channels. Furthermore, in its policy paper,
the Communication demonstrates a positive disposition to intervene at
different key points of the intrafirm channel (value chain), from one end
in developed countries by stimulating demand though public
procurement, to the other end in developing countries by supporting
36. See BETrER FACTORIES CAMBODIA, http://betterfactories.org (last visited July 9,
2015).
37. Commission Communication on Trade, Growth and Development and Tailoring
Trade and Investment Policy for Those Countries Most in Need, at 14, COM (2012) 22 final
(Jan. 27, 2012).
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responsible exporters and local certification schemes.38 The search for
coherence is clearly detectable and CSR (intrafirm channel) is explicitly
on the agenda,39 but more needs to be done to move beyond what
currently appears as mere enumerations of policy domains and toward a
more clearly conceptualized interaction and complementarity of
channels.40 This can also improve the historically weak implementation
record and thus exert more leverage on Type 2 root causes.41
This article impressed so far that in dealing with developing
countries, there is a shift underway in trade law from the potentially
coercive and unilateral GSP approach since 1970,42 and from the pure
trade law approach of tariff-reducing trade agreements from the 1990s,
toward more encompassing FTAs that include labor clauses and
predominantly employ cooperative, capacity-building measures.43 This
important shift needs to be placed in an even broader context. FTAs
grow in complexity too by including at times investment protections
that otherwise would have been found in pure investment instruments
like bilateral investment treaties (BITs). With such economic
agreements that amalgamate trade and investment aspects comes the
possibility to refer directly to "CSR,"44 which is imported into the trade
agreement through the investment-related provisions. It is a reference
to the intrafirm channel that can potentially commit both home and
host states to strengthening the legal obligations of MNEs and
affiliates. Thus the trade and investment agreement can become a
'"ost" for the corporate responsibility to respect in a very different way
than the U.S.-Cambodia trade agreement, which created an opportunity
38. See id. at 9-15.
39. An in-depth study of EU policies found that "the inter-linkages between trade,
investment, development cooperation and human rights are actively being operationalised
by the EU's institutions .... [This indicates] a sense of a 'fresh start [sic] for the EU to
take the lead in implementing a more consistent, coherent and effective external action
which prioritises human rights." Laura Beke, et al., Report on the Integration of Human
Rights in EU Development and Trade Policies, at 141-42, Deliverable No. 9.1 (2014).
40. See Expert Conference on Guiding Principles, Copenhagen, May 7-8, 2012, From
Principles to Practice: The European Union Operationalizing the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, 3, 10 (2012) (highlighting issues of policy
coherence, leverage, and alignment of policies). '
41. For a recent in-depth study of European FTAs and GSPs, see Beke et al., supra
note 39, at 140-41.
42. See Cecilia Malmstr6m, Comm'r for Trade, Eur. Comm'n, EU Africa Trade: A New
Partnership (June 3, 2015).
43. See Simpson, supra note 33, at 20-43 (describing several free trade agreement
examples containing labor clauses).
44. The European Union states that "[miodern and pro-development trade policies"
address a complex range of issues, from trade facilitation to social and environmental
regulations, investment, intellectual property rights, competition, and government
procurement. Commission Communication, supra note 37, at 5.
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rather than a responsibility for international buyers, and an obligation
on the host state of Cambodia. Having an investment instrument (as
opposed to a trade instrument) refer to CSR and the intrafirm channel
is nothing new in itself. Indeed, the OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises, one of the first and most authoritative international soft
law instruments on CSR, has since 1976 accompanied the rules on
investment that the OECD states have been promoting.45 The only
problem was that such references to the responsibilities of investors (or
CSR), as laid down in the OECD Guidelines, remained voluntary and
thus amounted to a soft strategy of linking investment to human rights.
Even worse, investment agreements (the nearly 3000 BITs) offered
broad, legally enforceable protection for their commercial interests.
46
Indeed, from a human rights perspective, the debate has always been
about the imbalance in investment agreements between the legal rights
of investors and their absent hard legal obligations; and between the
ability of investors to enforce their rights through international
arbitration and the corresponding shrinking policy space of host states
to pursue social and environmental public aims (e.g., the right to
regulate and stabilization clauses).
47
This amalgamation of trade and investment provisions in modern
FTAs, therefore, can give rise to charges of hypocrisy against developed
states: on one hand, the trade provisions affirm the social clause and
build capacity of host states (thus addressing Type 2 root causes), and
on the other hand, the investment provisions exacerbate Type 2 root
causes (undermining the "right to regulate" of host states) and ignore
Type 1 root causes (investors' rights are not accompanied by human
rights obligations) while at most paying lip service to investor
responsibilities through lofty CSR pronouncements. It is therefore
important to place such a potentially devastating blow to the modern
trade channel in its wider context: that of the very recent megaregional
agreements.48 Their arrival is set to address the concerns of civil society
over the excesses of the BITs4 9 by safeguarding the host state's right to
45. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 967 (June 21, 1976).
46. Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy, at 21
(October 2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs2015/october/tradoc_
153846.pdf.
47. See RUGGIE, supra note 3, at 182-7.
48. For the multiple causes beyond these mega-regional agreements, see Steve
Woolcock, The Impact of Mega Regional Agreements on International Investment Rules
and Norms, 13 SWEDISH INST. FOR EUR. POL'Y STUD. 4 (2015).
49. See Karl P. Sauvant, The Times They Are A-Changin'--A gain-In the Relationships
between Governments and Multinational Enterprises: From Control, to Liberalization to
Rebalancing, COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 69, May 21, 2012, at 2-3.
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regulate and by adjusting the international arbitration mechanism
previously so favorable to investors.50 Furthermore, whether the
responsibilities of investors for their human rights impacts will be
"hosted" by such agreements-in a legally binding form or not-remains
an open question.51 These changes are the result of international
investment law evolving beyond the developed states-developing states
negotiations to a new paradigm involving developed states-developed
states negotiations, where old rules are being questioned and likely
improved. These corrections are a good sign for investment law itself, as
they remove glaring pro-investor excesses and insert CSR references, as
well as for trade law, which has grown in complexity to include "labor
clauses" but risks being undercut by outdated investment provisions.
In sum, the modern trade law approach and the potential of the
international trade channel appear promising from a root-cause
perspective and interaction-of-channels standpoint, with the caveat that
an implementation approach that prefers cooperation to coercion can
deliver softer rather than harder leverage to the business and human
rights regime.
B. State-State Channels: International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and
Development Aid (ODA)
The policy domains of IHRL and ODA have traditionally had a
direct bearing on inadequate regulatory regimes in host countries but
are also finding new ways to relate to the intrafirm channel, trade, and
investment. Thus, on one hand, the IHRL channel-through its treaty
bodies52 and special procedures5 3 -is discharging, more effectively and
at a level of higher quality, its limited powers to ensure host states
50. See Euro. Parl. Comm. on Int'l Trade, Rep. Containing the European Parliament's
Recommendations to the European Commission on the Negotiations for the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership, at 17-18, Doc. A8-0175 (June 1, 2015).
51. See id. at 17 (asking TTIP negotiators to "[e]nsure that TTIP contains a
comprehensive chapter on investment . . . [and addresses] investors' obligations and
responsibilities by referring, inter alia, to the OECD principles for multinationals
enterprises and to the UN principles on Business and human rights benchmarks.").
52. See generally U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights, Strengthening the United
Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System, U.N. Doc. A/66/860 (June 2012) (by
Navanethem Pillay); G.A. Res. 68/268, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/268 (Apr. 21, 2014).
53. See generally INGRID NIFOSI, THE UN SPECIAL PROCEDURES IN THE FIELD OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); Surya P. Subedi et al., The Role of the Special Rapporteurs of the
United Nations Human Rights Council in the Development and Promotion of International
Human Rights Norms, 15 INTL J. HUM. RTS. 155 (2011).
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comply with their international obligations.54  A multichannel
perspective on business and human rights does not obscure or downplay
such progress, but seeks ways to reinforce it and enhance the leverage
of IHRL standards and mechanisms. On the other hand, additional to
this traditional focus on host states, there is currently an evolution in
U.N. oversight mechanisms and academic scholarship toward discussing
the responsibility of home states, usually under the "extraterritorial
obligations" label.55 For example, international trade and investment
agreements that home states negotiate with developing countries should
be subject to human rights impact assessments, as proposed by the
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.56 Furthermore, U.N. treaty
bodies and special procedures give more attention to the intrafirm
channel. Thus, the issuance of the Guiding Principles in 2011 markedly
empowered U.N. human rights bodies to comment on the home states'
failures to influence their companies operating abroad and to ensure
such companies employ human rights due diligence.5 7 This trend is set
to continue with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights explicitly stating it will continue to request information from
home states about MNEs falling within their jurisdictions.58 In addition,
several U.N. Special Rapporteurs-on water and sanitation, the right to
54. See U.N. Secretary-General, Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of
Reports to be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties: Rep.
of the Secretary-General, 1 11, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/2/Rev.6 (Jun. 3, 2009).
55. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Rep. of
Ger., Oct. 15-Nov. 2, 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR'C/DEU/CO/6 (Nov. 12, 2012) ('The State party
is encouraged . . . to take appropriate measures to strengthen the remedies provided to
protect people who have been victims of activities of such business enterprises operating
abroad.").
56. See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Guiding Principles on Human Rights
Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, 19th Sess., 1.1, at 5, U.N. Doc. AJHRC/19/59/Add.5 (Dec. 19, 2011) (by
Olivier De Schutter).
57. See U.N. Secretary-General, Contribution of the United Nations System as a Whole
to the Advancement of the Business and Human Rights Agenda and the Dissemination and
Implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, T 19, 35-36,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/21 (July 2, 2012) ("Treaty bodies may use the Guiding Principles ...
to inform their dialogue with States parties under the treaty reporting process, individual
complaints and in the elaboration of general comments, statements and other treaty body
output that address States parties' obligations.").
58. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., Statement on the Obligations of States
Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, May 2-20,
2011, 77 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 (May 20, 2011) ("IT]he Committee calls on States
Parties to include in their initial and periodic reports information on challenges faced and
measures taken in relation to the role and impact of the corporate sector on the realization
of economic, social and cultural rights.").
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food, indigenous peoples, and the freedom of expression-released
thematic reports on business impacts on specific human rights.
59
It is apparent that U.N. treaty bodies and special procedures have
developed a sharper focus on trade and investment at the interstate and
intrafirm levels; they seek to maximize the soft legal institutionalization
capacity of the IHRL channel by expanding their focus beyond host
states' compliance to cover the obligations of home states and the
responsibilities of commercial entities. Interpreting treaty law and
relying on soft law instruments such as the Guiding Principles, U.N.
bodies are developing more finely tuned assessments and concrete
recommendations for the interstate and intrafirm economic channels. In
return, economic channels like the EU General System of Preferences or
the CSR-type Better Factories Cambodia scheme rely on the compliance
assessments of ILO and its technical expertise in labor issues.6 0 These
point to a growing interaction between the IHRL channel and economic
channels in an effort to tackle root causes of infringements of human
rights throughout the value chain.
Development cooperation has for a long time referred to rule of law,
democracy, human rights, and good governance.61 In this way, the
human rights performance of host states (Type 2 root causes) has been
traditionally addressed through the aid channel by developed states
either offering economic aid backed by (negative or positive) human
rights-related conditionalities62 or directly supporting processes and
institutions relevant to human rights.63 In terms of implementation, the
aid channel featured the full spectrum of mechanisms, from capacity-
building to soft persuasion and even coercion, to enhance the human
rights regime in recipient countries.64  Furthermore, as the
59. See generally GLOBAL BuS. INITIATIVE ON HUM. RTS. & INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & Bus.,
STATE OF PLAY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS IN BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS 58 (2012) [hereinafter STATE OF PLAY].
60. For example, the EU GSP mechanism assesses tate compliance with human and
labor rights by relying on the findings of the ILO and UN monitoring bodies. See
Commission Regulation 978/2012, arts. 9.1(b), 13, 14.3, Annex VIII, 2012 O.J. (L 303) 7, 8,
60-61 (EU).
61. See generally KINLEY, supra note 12, at 93-104 (detailing the historical
developments and main interaction between economic aid, development, and human
rights).
62. See Beke et al., supra note 39, at 91-92 ("Conditionality can affect three levels of
decision making: deciding on the choice of partner countries (also referred to as
'selectivity'), the amount of ODA to be provided to a country, and the way in which this
assistance is provided.").
63. See id. at 121-30 (discussing integration of human rights considerations in
programming processes).
64. See id. at 71 (discussing the examples of the little effective GSP+ sanctions taken
against Belarus and Myanmar).
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developmental paradigm shifted away from state-driven development
models, ODA has concentrated increasingly on private sector
development and on linking local businesses to international markets.
This led not only to public-private partnerships for development, but
also led naturally to ODA support for CSR. Thus ODA has supported
the intrafirm channel directly by building capacity around responsible
value chain management for more than a decade now. Notably, support
has gone to different strategic points of the intrafirm channel: support
directly for affiliates to gain access to international markets, to
corporate accountability NGOs, to multistakeholder CSR initiatives,
and to standardization efforts in view of the essential role of standards
in global trade. Channeling funds to promote responsible business
conduct has also been politically convenient for home states reluctant to
adopt stronger regulatory approaches to their multinationals. Finally,
the ongoing alignment of ODA with the modern trade law agenda has
proceeded as the latter expanded to emphasize more institutional
strengthening in relation to labor rights, environmental protections,
rule of law, and regional integration. In sum, ODA, with its softer
strategies of capacity building and sometimes accompanied by stronger
strategies involving human rights conditionalities, relates easily to root
causes-whether host states or companies throughout the intrafirm
channel-and adds its leverage to other policy channels addressed here.
C. Intrafirm Channel: Home-State Regulations and Corporate
Voluntarism
Corporations respond to hard and soft legal institutionalization of
corporate responsibilities, but also to organizational, market, and
societal stimuli. Developments in the intrafirm channel have been
notable. A range of regulations in home states has recently appeared,
most prominent being transparency laws that cover social and
environmental impacts of corporate activities, both at home and abroad.
The highest profile example of disclosure regulation of a broad
applicability is the 2014 EU Directive, with national laws to enter into
force in 2017.65 Other significant and recently adopted laws relate to
specific issues such as transparency of payments in the natural resource
sector and conflict minerals.66 This is a notable step forward from the
pioneering though extremely general legal requirements that were
65. Council Directive 2014/95/EU, art. 4, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 8.
66. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 1502, 1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18, 2220-22 (2010).
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placed on financial companies67 or on large companies68 in few
jurisdictions around the year 2000. "Transparency" has been a constant
rallying call of corporate accountability groups eager to move beyond
self-regulation and corporate voluntarism schemes. Although a legal
requirement, the route between such transparency laws and respecting
human rights is tortuous; coercion is indirect and uncertain as it will
come from market and societal actors, not from courts or regulatory
agencies. This is a soft legal institutionalization approach, particularly
so when information disclosed covers broad areas in a rather general
manner, less so when it is highly specific.69 Such laws start a dialogue,
prompt corporate learning through self-assessments inherent in
preparing a public report, and, should that fail, may facilitate societal
mobilization to influence companies.
Another significant action-whether to be characterized as a soft or
hard legalization strategy-by home states is of a contractual nature,
given that states are not only regulators but economic actors too: states
are buyers in the area of public procurement,70 and financial actors in
investments, credits, and guarantees for companies operating abroad.
71
As with transparency laws, states are in the position to apply leverage
at the top of the value chain by asking core companies to demonstrate
that they undertook human rights due diligence. There is also the angle
of transnational litigation, by definition a hard law strategy targeting
the intrafirm channel at the very top with coercive civil or criminal legal
action. While the territorial boundaries are not an obstacle per se,72 this
strategy targets only Type 1 root causes, as the principles of tort law
67. See, e.g., Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture,
Bankruptcy etc.) Amendment Regulations, 1999, c.2 § 4(b) (U.K.).
68. See, e.g., Loi 2001-420 du 15 mai 2001 relative aux nouvelles r6gulations
6conomiques [Law 2001-420 of May 15, 2001 on New Economic Regulations], LEGIFRANCE,
Feb. 20, 2002.
69. See Elizabeth R. Gorman, When the Poor Have Nothing Left to Eat: The United
States' Obligation to Regulate American Investment in the African Land Grab, 75 OHIO ST.
L.J. 199, 226-28 (2014) (discussing the application of Dodd-Frank).
70. See Council Directive 2014/24, art. 18, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 105-06 (EU). See generally
Olga Martin-Ortega et al., Buying Power and Human Rights in the Supply Chain: Legal
Options for Socially Responsible Public Procurement of Electronic Goods, 19 INT'L J. HUM.
RTS., 341 (2015) (detailing the potential of the EU legal regime for public procurement as
a tool for the promotion of human rights in the electronics industry supply chain).
71. See Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at §§ 4-6.
72. Note the "presumption against extraterritoriality" established by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1663-69 (2013). See
generally Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta.Symposium: The Death of the ATS and the Rise of
Transnational Tort Litigation, OPINIO JURIS (April 17, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/
04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-transnational-tort-litigation
(discussing the future of the Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel).
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applied in such cases require a strong involvement of the core company
(own culpable conduct) in the affiliate's abusive operations.73
Moving beyond home state regulation of MNEs, leading companies
have adopted progressive CSR strategies that increasingly reveal a root-
cause orientation in "diagnosing" human rights infringements in
affiliate operations and "curing" those infringements through
alignment-of-channels trategies. It is important to note the evolution in
CSR strategies based on twenty years of sometimes unsuccessful efforts
that created a better understanding in the business sector itself of the
limits of simplistic depictions of CSR, whereby influential core
companies can and should compel weaker entities in the value chain to
"clean up their act." Facilitated by shortcomings-and-failures of (dyadic)
CSR where the company "polices" its contractors into compliance, the
field of CSR has evolved to a stage where leading companies
demonstrate awareness of, and take action on, root causes consisting of
their own decisions (Type 1) as well as root causes pertaining to the
affiliate and the host state's regulatory environment (Type 2). This
clearly requires a notion of CSR that is aware of, and interacting with,
other policy channels, which are increasingly open to alignment and
interaction to maximize leverage over root causes.
Regarding Type 1 causes, there are now frank admissions from
some companies about how their own practices contribute to
infringements throughout the supply chains. Nike, for example, made
stunning acknowledgements about its own contributions to labor abuses
abroad. Excessive overtime, for example, was found to be caused by
Nike's own decisions in 68 percent of cases.74 Nike is also restructuring
its supply chain to pursue longer-term relationships with key
suppliers.75 This frankness makes it disingenuous to frame an affiliate's
noncompliance as being rooted exclusively in causes present locally in
the host state, and makes it more difficult for MNEs to shift the blame
wholesale to the affiliate (a supplier's social irresponsibility) or to the
host state (government inability or unwillingness to regulate suppliers),
thus obscuring downward pressures on affiliates created by MNEs and
cutthroat market competition (the "invisible hand" of hypercompetitive
markets). This root cause of value-chain problems is now not only
73. See Choc, 2013 ONSC 1414, supra note 25, at 44-53.
74. Nike wrote that it "continued to assess root causes of excessive overtime .... [It
was able to establish that 68% of incidents analyzed] were attributable to factors within
Nike's control, primarily forecasting or capacity planning issues, shortened production
timelines and seasonal spikes." NIKE INC., NIKE, INC. FY1O/l SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY, 20, 53 (2012).
75. See STATE OF PLAY, supra note 59, at 109 (discussing the growing trend and
opportunities involved with supply chain consolidation).
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identified as such by "antiglobalization" NGOs, but is also supported by
corporate documents and highlighted by the Guiding Principles in
Principle 13 (the "contribution" scenario).
As a result, easy justifications for inaction or for simplistic "policing
the direct suppliers" approaches are fading. A new focus on root causes
delivers a better understood responsibility to assess one's own
contributions (Type 1) and also to exercise leverage over others (Type 2).
The approach of H&M and other brands to the issue of "living wage" in
Cambodia defines expressly the role of buyers vis-&-vis the role of the
host government and unions in creating a mature industrial relations
system by involving the ILO and drawing on Swedish development aid.
Such a strategy addresses Type 2 root causes, as it puts government,
employers, and labor on notice that it is not the buyers' role to set
wages.76 However, these buyers have not overlooked Type 1 root causes,
as these brands are committed to keep sourcing as long as local parties
are committed to a proper settling of the wage issue.77 This commitment
is essential, as it tackles the possibility of buyers redirecting purchasing
orders-a facile compliance strategy for buyers to separate themselves
from human rights abuses-and thus enables local actors to improve
their conduct by removing a significant disincentive for suppliers and
the host government, fearful of diminishing the international
competitiveness of their industry.
As to Type 2 root causes, the last decades of CSR reveal that, often,
the effective solution to affiliate noncompliance is not to be found in the
dyadic buyer-supplier relationship, with its mistaken corollary of the
buyer having to only monitor and audit the affiliate.78 This is a
simplified, often inappropriate or insufficient, way of exercising leverage
in the value chain. To tackle local root causes, more complex strategies
should be pursued. For example, the Rana Plaza factory collapse in
Bangladesh that killed over 1,100 workers resulted in two industry
responses: the Accord and the Alliance.79 Furthermore, the European
76. Press Release, H&M, Response to Business & Human Rights Resource Center,
http://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/defaultfiles/documents/H&M-response-22-9-
2014.pdf (last visited July 9, 2015).
77. Letter from Philip Chamberlain, C&A Head of External Stakeholder Engagement,
et al., to H.E. Keat Chhon, Permanent Deputy Prime Minister of the Royal Government of
the Kingdom of Cambodia (Sept. 18, 2014) (on the upcoming wage negotiations),
http://about.hm.com/content/dam/hmlabout/documents/masterlanguage/CSR/Others/Lette
r%20to%20DPM%2OCambodian%20Government%20September%202014.pdf.
78. This approach largely unchanged over the last 20 years. See STATE OF PLAY, supra
note 59, at 66.
79. See generally Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, May 13, 2013,
available at http://www.achact.be/upload/files/BangladeshAccord-on_fire_andbuilding
safety_2013.pdf; Member Agreement of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, July
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Union, ILO, and the government of Bangladesh reacted with a
"Sustainability Compact" in 2013 aimed at raising labor standards in
the export-oriented textile sector.8 0 Here, the ILO provides expertise
and technical assistance to the government as it strengthens labor laws,
while the European Union resorts to its development aid programs to
fund such improvements. Among the key deliverables of this joint effort,
freedom of association takes center stage through the introduction of the
ILO-IFC Better Work Programme in Bangladesh to improve industrial
relations and dialogue at the enterprise level. Other measures refer to a
larger number of labor inspectors and a publicly accessible database as
a platform for reporting labor, fire, and building safety inspections.
Exemplifying alignment of policy channels, the Sustainability Compact
welcomes the Accord as an example of buyers coordinating their efforts.
In sum, the advanced CSR strategies of leading companies today evince
a root-cause orientation and a search for more complex solutions,
revealing alignment and interaction with other policy channels.
III. A MULTICHANNEL, TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The operations of MNEs and the increasing integration of national
economies through international trade and investment agreements
expose the territorial state, and the international human rights law
order relying on states, to new challenges. For human rights, these
challenges take the shape of new threats as international economic law
instruments augment the influence of transnational economic forces and
markets, which are not inherently sensitive to distributional aspects
like human rights risks and impacts. There are also new opportunities
for human rights to bypass well known structural weaknesses of
international human rights law where enforcement options are
generally weak and dependent on states' commitments.8 1 Both these
2013, available at http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/filestAlliance-Member-Agreement-
FINAL.pdf.
80. Sustainability Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour Rights and
Factory Safety in the Ready-made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh,
Bangl.-ILO-EU, July 8, 2013, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2013/july/tradoc_151601.pdf.
81. See John Ruggie, Progress in Corporate Accountability, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & Bus.
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/progress-in-corporate-accountability.html
("Expanding the international human rights regime to encompass business conduct runs
smack into some the most prominent features of the current world polity and global
economy: national sovereignty; competition among states for markets, investments and
access to resources; the emergence of new global powers with their own views about both
business and human rights; weak or corrupt governments in many countries; competition
DECENTERING HuMAN RIGHTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 195
threats and opportunities present legal theory with pressing challenges
as how best to secure the normativity of international human rights
across boundaries-territorial, organizational, and policy-domain
boundaries-in new ways that both are feasible and maximize leverage
in the service of human rights. Conceptual treatments of human rights
in a less state-centered global order do not seek mistakenly to reinforce
distinctions such as those between hard and soft law, between legal and
nonlegal, private and public, territorial and extraterritorial, but to
transcend such distinctions with a decisive focus on root causes and a
search for new regulatory arrangements to tackle them.8 2 In this sense,
decentering the legal protection of human rights represents as much a
challenge to a state-hegemonic concept of international human rights
law under threat from globalized economic interdependencies as it is an
opportunity for law to reassert itself through old and new policy
channels and regulatory strategies to secure human rights.
8 3
The role of states in ensuring responsible business conduct has been
clarified in recent years. First, the classic international human rights
law stance remains as relevant as ever, with territorial states expected
to respect and ensure human rights within their jurisdiction. Second,
the role of states-whether home states of MNEs or host states-in
institutionalizing human rights due diligence is also clear, given
precedents in numerous other legal fields.8 4 Third, the references to
"smart policy mixes" dispel previously misguided framings of CSR as
"voluntarism" only,8 5 and orient attention to the major task of aligning
policy channels. Here is my area of focus. I highlighted three sets of
among firms for profits and market share; the corporate law principles of the legal
separation between parent company and affiliates, coupled with investors' limited
liability; asymmetries of capacity and influence between large companies and many
governments; large swaths of conflict zones; few and highly contested bases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction - the list goes on.").
82. See, for example, how the IHRL channel is capturing this orientation in the ILO
2014 Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention. Article 2 states that the measures to
address forced labor include "(e) supporting due diligence by both the public and private
sectors to prevent and respond to risks of forced or compulsory labour; and (f) addressing
the root causes and factors that heighten the risks of forced or compulsory labour."
Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention (P029), 1930, art. II, June 11, 2014
(emphasis added), available at http://www.ilo.org/dynnormlexenlf?.p=NORMEXPUB:
12100:0::NO::P12100_ILOCODE:P029.
83. Kinley deemed this opportunity as "one whose vital importance cannot be
overlooked." KINLEY, supra note 12, at 169.
84. See OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER ET AL. HumAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE: THE ROLE OF
STATES 49-55 (2012).
85. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 3, 6-
7, COM (2011) 681 final (Dec. 25, 2011) (detailing the a new definition that includes the
multidimensionality of CSR).
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opportunities on which the emerging regulatory regime of business and
human rights is being built: first, the opening up of state economic
channels to human rights aspects, especially modern trade law; second,
the human rights-dedicated channels (human rights law and, partly,
development aid), which are not content with pursuing the territorial
state's compliance with ratified treaties, which they strive to do in a
more effective way, but are paying increased attention to economic
channels (trade) and the intrafirm channel (MNEs); and third, the
opportunities to enhance leverage through alignment, complementarity,
and interaction of policy channels (policy coherence and "smart" policy
mixes).
The relevance of states and public law is not diminishing in human
rights, as I have argued, but there are new sources of leverage to be
captured and new pathways toward human rights protection that
emerging regulatory regimes mobilize and institutionalize.8 6 I argue
that a root-cause perspective and the softer legal institutionalization
performed in several policy channels are two factors that should not be
overlooked; indeed, they are indispensable to bringing together the
policy domains in a common conceptual treatment, as well as to
pursuing a strategy of change that seeks gaining strength by aligning
weak policy channels normatively and making them interact
institutionally. In other words, it is a picture of a regulatory regime
coming to terms with the multiple, though limited, tools in its arsenal
and therefore seeking to gather strength by bundling together weak
strands (soft legal institutionalization options) into a "rope" that targets
root causes of problems rather than their symptoms. This strategy is
indispensable with respect to Type 2 root causes, and promises to send
to the host governments a consistent message on multiple channels-
economic as well as classical channels dedicated to human rights-that
the local regulatory regime should ensure respect for human rights
while other participants in international trade come to perceive
credible, locally embedded arrangements (from local laws to private
certification of affiliates) as an inherent component of their mandates
and social responsibilities.
86. Eberlein and colleagues write about Transnational Business Governance (TBG) as
being "rooted in a regulatory governance perspective that views TBG as a dynamic, co-
regulatory, and co-evolutionary process involving state, non-state, and hybrid actors and
organizations that pursue varied interests, possess different regulatory capacities, and
interact at multiple levels and in multiple ways, with a range of effects." BURKARD
EBERLEIN ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS:
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 16 (2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2347166.
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To return to the U.N. Guiding Principles, my argument here is
compatible with the "polycentric governance" of the Guiding Principles,
with the "smart mix" of laws and policies that regulators increasingly
invoke, and with the multistakeholder collaborations known from the
CSR movement of the last twenty years. Many believe that the U.N.
mandate marked a qualitative leap in reasoning about business and
human rights. In human rights due diligence, Ruggie saw a conceptual
device for breaking through organizational boundaries which, in law,
are embodied by the principle of separation of entities.87 Ruggie bet on
the risk-management dimension of due diligence to prompt core
companies to action to address impacts wherever they might happen in
the value chain.88 Powered by a due diligence concept able to cross
organizational boundaries within multinational value chains, the
responsibility to respect became capable of crossing territorial
boundaries as well. Indeed, Ruggie stressed that extraterritoriality of
state obligations is a controversial concept that proponents and
opponents unnecessarily use wholesale. Instead, Ruggie maintained,
home states regulating their own companies is not the same as home
states directly regulating affiliates domiciled abroad, which would
indeed be extraterritorial and problematic.8 9 In this way, the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights, and particularly human rights
due diligence, not only captured a business rationality that is not
dependent on law and state action,90 but also became potential vehicles
for future legal institutionalization efforts in various policy domains.
Ruggie's work created the possibility for law to reassert itself globally
through the intrafirm channel,9 1 allowing endless combinations of public
regulation, private regulation, standardization and capacity-building
measures involving a multitude of policy channels.
87. See RUGGIE, supra note 3, at 188-189 ("[H]ow do we get a multinational
corporation to assume the responsibility to respect human rights for the entire corporate
group, not atomize it down to its various constituent units? . . . Under the corporate-
responsibility-to-respect-human-rights pillar, I did not set out to establish a global
enterprise legal liability model.... My aim was to prescribe practical ways of integrating
human rights concerns within enterprise risk-management systems.").
88. Radu Mares, "Respect" Human Rights: Concept and Convergence in LAw, BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BRIDGING THE GAP 3, 22-35 (Robert C. Bird et al. eds., 2014)
(demonstrating how Ruggie's strategic bet in due diligence navigated around the
separation of entities principle).
89. RUGGIE, supra note 3, at 140-41.
90. The Guiding Principles state that the corporate responsibility to respect "exists
independently of States' abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights
obligations." See Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at 13.
91. Ruggie believes that "some form of further international legalization in business
and human rights is both necessary and desirable" but the issue for the SRSG mandate
"has never been about international egalization as such." Ruggie, supra note 9.
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CONCLUSION
Where human rights protections and rule of law are weak, human
rights are predictably and regularly being infringed upon by business
operations. The analysis started with the Guiding Principles, which put
forward a corporate responsibility to respect human rights and exercise
human rights due diligence. The responsibilities of multinational
enterprises were clarified and then placed in a wider context. Instead of
a uni-channel treatment of business and human rights focused on the
intrafirm channel of MNEs and the parent company's responsibilities,
the analysis advanced a multichannel perspective on the affiliate
companies because their operations directly impact rights holders. Such
affiliates respond to stimuli from their international value chain and
their domestic regulatory environment.
My aim was to identify relevant policy channels and to assess their
force in bringing affiliate companies into compliance. The relevancy was
determined according to the direct and indirect impact of each policy
channel on the business affiliate. Thus, the intrafirm channel was
immediately relevant, as were any policy channels impacting the host
state, which has an indisputable obligation to safeguard human rights
under classical international human rights law. Channels-old and
new-focused on human rights, commerce, or development were
covered: CSR, international human rights law, trade law, development
aid, and home state regulations. The analysis highlighted notable
openings and documented increased interactions among policy channels.
The force for change exerted by these policy channels was assessed in
terms of harder or softer institutionalization strategies directed towards
the business affiliate, the core company, and the host state. The decision
was to not discard policy channels that carry softer forms of leverage, as
the emerging transnational regime cannot afford to waste any source of
leverage.
The question, then, is how to reason about softer institutionalization
strategies. If they should not be discarded, and if they are not
necessarily evolving to deliver coercive forces, how can their impact be
meaningful in an area like human rights where the stakes are so high?
The article dealt with this question in two ways: by separating two
contexts of corporate responsibility and by proposing an integrated
assessment of policy channels. First, the analysis in Part I clarified two
contexts that can be discerned from the widely endorsed Guiding
Principles. In one such context, coercion is clearly warranted,
precedents in tort law exist, and coercive legal solutions could be
adopted at international and home state levels. This separation of the
two contexts prevents sliding seamlessly from one context to the other
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through inattentive or deliberately misleading argumentation. This
cleared the way for the analysis of softer institutionalization strategies.
Second, to account for softer institutionalization strategies the
article focused on the interactions of policy channels and their
dispositions to acknowledge and tackle root causes. Thus two key
elements-a root-cause orientation and the interaction of channels-
are proposed as indispensable for a regulatory and systemic perspective
on business and human rights. Part II presented encouraging recent
developments in five policy channels that display a proper orientation
and interaction. The thesis here is that the emerging transnational
regulatory regime can increase leverage through the alignment of policy
channels and the bundling of softer legal and nonlegal
institutionalization strategies into a stronger "rope." This has legal and
human rights significance.
In sum, the article put forward a multichannel, rights-holder-
centered, transnational regulatory perspective that descriptively
accounts for new developments in key policy areas, analytically
examines the points of interactions and complementarity among
relevant policy channels linked to international commerce, and
normatively seeks the alignment of these channels to deal with root
causes of human rights abuses in business operations.
